Will the U.S. End Kagame’s “Tutsi Fighting Rights” in the DRC?

In a moment marked by increasing scrutiny of Rwanda’s role in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a powerful signal has emerged from Washington. During a recent visit to the region, Massad Boulos, the United States’ new Senior Advisor for Africa, delivered a strong and unmistakable message, the U.S. is prepared to consider “all diplomatic and economic tools” to push for peace in the Great Lakes region, with a clear focus on Rwanda’s military entanglements in the eastern DRC.

In his remarks to the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub, Boulos stated, “It’s been more than three decades, and it’s about time to end it… The United States does have quite a bit of tools at its disposal that it can and will use, if need be.” That statement may well mark a turning point in Washington’s traditionally cautious posture toward President Paul Kagame, a leader long held in high esteem by the West for rebuilding Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, but whose recent actions are drawing fierce criticism for reigniting regional instability through military interventions cloaked in moral and ethnic justifications.

At the center of this growing controversy is President Paul Kagame himself. In a recent fiery speech commemorating the 1994 genocide, Kagame took an aggressively defiant tone. “Go to hell,” he said to critics urging him to withdraw Rwandan forces from Congolese soil. Framing the Rwandan presence in eastern Congo as a legitimate pursuit of the FDLR, a Rwandan rebel group with ties to genocide perpetrators.

Kagame forcefully rejected accusations of mineral exploitation and regional destabilization. “If it were about minerals,” Kagame argued, “we would be as rich as those who make the accusations. That is the war between the dark past and the cruel present.” He framed Rwanda as a scapegoat, suggesting that Western critics are themselves complicit in Congo’s mineral plundering. Yet this framing is being increasingly challenged by human rights observers, and now, American diplomats.

While Kagame positions Rwanda as a victim of global hypocrisy, critics argue that his government has long used the narrative of genocide survival to justify aggressive foreign interventions and the suppression of dissent, both at home and abroad. Human rights groups have documented repeated incursions by Rwandan forces into eastern DRC, often accompanied by allegations of targeted killings, forced displacement, and resource extraction.

Experts argue that Kagame’s invocation of ethnic security, the idea that Rwanda must strike first to protect itself from genocidal threats, has evolved into a political weapon. “What we are witnessing,” says Kalisa Egide, a regional analyst based in Nairobi, “is not self-defense. It’s a systematic campaign to maintain regional influence by projecting an existential threat narrative that no longer aligns with the realities on the ground.”

Indeed, the FDLR, while still present, is a significantly weakened force. The larger threat, critics argue, lies not with ragtag rebels but with Kagame’s strategic manipulation of ethnic fears to justify expansionism and deflect from mounting domestic repression.

The visit by Massad Boulos, alongside Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Corina Sanders, signals a growing discomfort in Washington. Their emphasis on the U.S.’s diplomatic and economic leverage is being interpreted by many as a thinly veiled threat, Rwanda’s immunity from Western pressure may be coming to an end.

This marks a notable departure from previous U.S. administrations, which have often overlooked Kagame’s transgressions in favor of regional stability and his role as a reliable Western ally in Africa. But the calculus is changing. As the humanitarian crisis in eastern Congo deepens, and as Rwanda’s role in fueling that crisis becomes harder to ignore, even longtime allies are reconsidering their support.

Across the Great Lakes region, Kagame’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric is being met with growing alarm. Congolese officials have long accused Rwanda of backing M23 rebels and other proxy groups that have terrorized civilians in North Kivu and Ituri. Burundi President Evalisto Ndayishimiye expressed concern about Rwanda’s militarization of ethnic narratives and its destabilizing influence.

“Rwanda is acting like a regional hegemon under the cover of victimhood,” says Bernadette Mbabazi, a political scientist and expert on Great Lakes geopolitics. “The ethnic justification for military action is a dangerous precedent. If not checked, it could reignite broader ethnic violence across the region.”

The question now is whether the international community, led by the United States, will take concrete steps to restrain Kagame’s military ambitions. Sanctions, aid reductions, or diplomatic isolation are among the tools Washington could employ, though each carries risks of its own.

Yet, many argue that failure to act would be a graver mistake. With millions displaced in eastern Congo, and with regional tensions mounting, Kagame’s narrative of preemptive defense cannot continue unchecked. His assertion that “we will not die not fighting like last time” may galvanize domestic support, but it sends chilling signals to neighboring countries and international observers.

President Kagame’s legacy as a post-genocide stabilizer is increasingly at odds with his image as a regional aggressor. As the U.S. begins to re-evaluate its position and consider stronger action, Rwanda’s role in perpetuating conflict under the guise of security is finally coming under the microscope. The world is watching, and the question remains: “will words be enough, or is it time for consequences?” Asked Mbabazi.

Though Kagame vehemently denies any official Rwandan military operation in the DRC, he paradoxically champions the cause of the M23 rebel group, framing them as Congolese Tutsis fighting for their rights. This selective deployment of ethnic identity starkly contradicts domestic policy in Rwanda, where all ethnic identification has been banned under the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” doctrine, a controversial policy intended to forge national unity by erasing ethnic distinctions.

Analysts argue that this so-called unity has served primarily to entrench Tutsi dominance in Rwanda’s political, military, and economic spheres. The same narrative of Tutsi victimhood and existential threat, is being applied beyond Rwanda’s borders to justify intervention in the DRC under the guise of combating the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda).

In reality, multiple sources, including former Rwandan General Kayumba Nyamwasa, have cast doubt on the ongoing threat posed by the FDLR. In an interview with international media, Nyamwasa claimed that “95% of the FDLR militias have already been integrated into the RDF [Rwandan Defence Forces]” during past joint operations with the DRC army under Joseph Kabila’s presidency.

Despite these claims, Kagame continues to invoke the FDLR as justification for military incursions into Congo, raising suspicion that the group has become more of a political tool than a genuine security threat. “The FDLR narrative has been Kagame’s golden ticket for three decades,” said Muheto David, a regional analyst. “It allows Rwanda to operate militarily in the DRC with moral cover, while simultaneously pursuing control over strategic mineral zones.”

Adding further complexity to the volatile situation is the reappearance of former DRC President Joseph Kabila, who recently returned from self-imposed exile in South Africa. Following secretive consultations with Rwandan officials in Kigali, Kabila entered Goma, a city at the heart of the conflict, where he has remained largely silent.

Reports now indicate that Kabila has aligned himself with the M23 rebel movement. His re-emergence has been viewed by Kinshasa as an act of treason. The government of President Félix Tshisekedi has responded by freezing Kabila’s assets and banning his political party, the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD). The former president, born to a Tutsi mother, Sifa Mahanya has been accused of siding with Kagame to shield Rwanda from growing international pressure.

The U.S. now finds itself recalibrating its stance. In an interview with a pro-government Rwandan outlet, Massad Boulos reiterated Washington’s goal, “The aim is to establish a full and lasting peace that will put everybody at ease.” This response, while diplomatic in tone, marks a clear shift in the West’s tolerance of Kagame’s aggressive regional posture.

“Kagame’s time must come to an end,” said Muheto David. “Kagame has menaced his neighbors for too long. His policies of ethnic dominance and manipulation must stop. Not all Tutsis are seeking to dominate other groups, and not all Rwandans support these policies.” David also highlighted the irony that Rwanda’s own foreign minister was once an FDLR spokesperson, further undermining Kagame’s narrative of principled resistance.

Kagame’s use of ethnic narratives, domestically muted, regionally inflamed, is no longer immune to criticism. With his government backing M23 under the banner of Tutsi rights while simultaneously denying ethnic distinctions at home, the contradictions are becoming impossible to ignore.

In the words of General Nyamwasa, once a trusted military ally turned exile: “This is not about security. This is about control.” And for the millions of Congolese caught in the crossfire, the cost of that control has been unrelenting tragedy.

More insights: https://www.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-senior-advisor-for-africa-massad-boulos-and-deputy-assistant-secretary-for-african-affairs-corina-sanders/